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Marx’s theory of value, the ‘new interpretation’, and the ‘empirical law of 
value’:  A recap note 
  
Ernesto Screpanti1  
  
This note is a recapitulation of the present state of the art in the debates on Marx’s labour 
theory of value. It summarizes the main reasons why this theory is problematic. At the same 
time, it claims that the theory of exploitation does not depend on a labour embodied valuation 
and can be expounded by resorting to the theory of production prices. Almost all Marxists 
have now accepted this truth. Most of them have been convinced by a ‘new interpretation’ 
which has been able to translate the labour commanded by net output into an amount of living 
labour and the rate of surplus value into a ratio between unpaid and paid labour. What 
produced such a result is the use of labour productivity as a numeraire. However there still are 
Marxists who retain allegiance to the labour theory of value, reinterpreted as an empirical law. 
Although the results of their econometric research do not seem wholly convincing, they 
contributed to question the historical appropriateness of the level of abstraction in Marx’s 
value theory. 
Key words: Marxian Economics, Labour Values, Prices of Production, Theory of Exploitation 
JEL Classifications: B14, E11 
 
1. Introduction  
All the debates on the labour theory of value have been sent off track by the way the 
value problem is set up by Marx himself: namely as a problem of the transformation 
of labour values into production prices. Marx does not realize that there is a basic 
difficulty, which is independent of the transformation problem. Indeed, although he 
appreciates Adam Smith’s notion of ‘labour commanded’, he does not grasp his 
motivation for rejecting embodied labour as a measure of value (Marx, 1861-63, II, 
153), namely, that value determination based on embodied labour is only valid in a 
non-capitalist economy. 
Labours commanded are production prices, and are determined in a way that makes 
them a correct expression of the technical and social conditions of production. Labour 
values, instead, only express technical conditions. These propositions are put forward 
in section 2, where a naive model of a corn-corn economy is used to show the validity 
of a labour commanded measure. Generalization to an economy producing n 
commodities does not modify this result.  
Section 3 addresses the transformation problem: given a double system approach, 
with a labour value system and a production price system, is it possible to transform 
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the former into the latter while keeping the profit and exploitation rates invariant? It is 
argued that, even when some aggregate invariance postulates are validated with 
opportune normalization, the basic problem remains unsolved – the problem of the 
inability of labour values to correctly express the social relations of production in a 
capitalist economy. In fact no reasonable normalization can achieve the invariance of 
the rate of exploitation and the rate of profit, which is tantamount to concluding that 
labour values are unsuitable to measure exploitation. 
Section 4 gives up the labour theory of value, and proposes a single system 
approach. Then, by normalizing prices with the average productivity of labour, the 
rate of exploitation is defined as a ratio between unpaid and paid labour. This is how 
many contemporary Marxists, resorting to a ‘new interpretation’, have come to accept 
the need to abandon the notion of ‘embodied labour’ as a substance of value. 
Actually, such reinterpretation is based on a re-proposal of Sraffa’s theory of 
production prices. 
Section 5 briefly recalls some contributions that purport to defend the labour theory 
of value on the ground of empirical research, and argues that the ‘empirical law of 
value’ is not fully convincing. This literature has nothing to do with the ‘new 
interpretation’. It is appraised here because it helps us to question the appropriateness 
of the level of abstraction based on the assumption of a uniform rate of profit, which 
is what is done in section 6. 
 
2. Labour embodied and labour commanded  
Let us start with the model of an economy producing corn by means of corn and 
labour. The one commodity model is useful to clarify that the basic difficulty in the 
labour theory of value has nothing to do with the transformation problem, but stems 
from the very definition of value in a capitalist economy.   
  Let 𝐴<1 be the quantity of corn required to produce one unit of corn,  the labour 
coefficient,  the labour embodied in one unit of corn, 𝑝 the production price, and 𝑟 
the rate of profit. The wage is posited as equal to 1, so the production price is 
measured in labour commanded. The labour value and the production price of one 
unit of corn are determined with the equations: 
𝑣 = 𝑙 + 𝑣 𝐴                       (1)  
𝑝 = 𝑙 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑝 𝐴 
whose solutions are:  
       (2)  
𝑣 = 𝑙(𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 = 𝑙(𝐼 + 𝐴 + ⋯ 𝐴t)                         (3)  
𝑝 = 𝑙(𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟) 𝐴)−1 = 𝑙(𝐼 + (1 + 𝑟) 𝐴 + ⋯ (1 + 𝑟)t 𝐴t)          (4)  
where 𝐼=1, and t tends to infinity. Notice that the wage rate does not appear in any 
equation, in (1) and (3) because it is not required to determine embodied labour, in (2) 
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and (4) because it is the numeraire. Equation (3) makes it clear that the labour value of 
output is the quantity of labour directly and indirectly used to produce it. Equations 
(3) and (4) reveal that, with 0≤𝑟<𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, it holds 𝑝≥𝑣. 
As shown in figure 1, the labour commanded by one unit of corn is greater than the 
labour embodied in it, and the greater the higher the profit rate. Labour commanded is 
a correct expression of value in an economy in which capitalists exploit wageworkers, 
since it rises when the rate of profit rises and decreases when the technical and labour 
coefficients shrink. Instead, given the technique, the labour embodied does not change 
with exploitation, and therefore labour values do not correctly express the social 
relations in a capitalist economy. 
 
  
Figure 1  
  
This could be the end of the story for, ‘if the theory is unsatisfactory even in the one-
commodity case [...] then the n-commodity case is less important’ (Ellerman, 1983, 
315). In any case, let us now reinterpret (1)-(4) as matrix equations. There are n 
industries and n goods.  and 𝑝 are vectors of labour values and production prices 
respectively,  a vector of homogenous labour coefficients, and I the identity matrix. 𝐴 
becomes an indecomposable matrix of technical coefficients. It remains true that, with 
0≤𝑟<𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, it is 𝑝≥𝑣. In fact (𝐼−(1+𝑟)𝐴)−1≥(𝐼−𝐴)−1. 
Whatever the numeraire, 𝑝≠𝑣 holds generically.2 Since production prices differ from 
labour values, the question arises: which give a significant theory of value, i.e. one 
that expresses the social relations of production in a capitalist economy? The answer 
is immediate: only prices yield a correct valuation, for they change when the social 
relations of exploitation change.   
Among all the possible price vectors, those normalized as labour commanded have a 
peculiar property: they are increasing functions of r.3 They are a transparent measure 
of value – transparent with respect to social relations as the labours commanded by all 
commodities rise with exploitation, given the technique.  
Such a property may be seen at work in the definition of the rate of exploitation 
measured in labour commanded, 𝑒𝑐: 
                                           
2 Apart from when 𝑟=0, a special case in which the labour theory of value holds strictly (𝑝=𝑣) is 
when l is an eigenvector of 𝐴 (Kurz & Salvadori, 1995, 110-3).  
3 The first derivatives of prices with respect to 𝑟 are 𝑝′(𝑟)=𝑙(𝐼−(1+𝑟)𝐴)−1𝐴(𝐼−(1+𝑟)𝐴)−1>0. 
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𝑒𝑐 =
𝑝(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝐿
𝐿
=
𝑙(𝐼−(1+𝑟)𝐴)−1(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝐿
𝐿
=
𝐿∗
𝐿
         (5)                                                                                             
where q is a vector of gross outputs, 𝐿=𝑙q is the employed labour force, or living 
labour, and L*=𝑝(𝐼−A)q−𝐿 is the quantity of labour that can be bought by surplus 
value. The rate of exploitation is an increasing function of the profit rate.  
Equation (5) measures the rate of exploitation as a ratio between two quantities of 
labour, that commanded by surplus value and that commanded by the wage. 
Capitalists have bought command over L workers, then they have exerted command 
over them in the production process so as to make them produce a surplus value, 
which may buy command over a further amount of labour, L*. Given the magnitude of 
living labour, the higher the rate of exploitation, the greater is L*.  
Rather interesting is the factor of exploitation, 1+𝑒𝑐=(𝐿+L*)⁄𝐿, which is equal to 
the inverse of the wage share in net output. It is a ratio between the labour 
commanded by the net output and that used to produce it (Screpanti, 2003). In the 
presence of exploitation, this factor is greater than 1 as ‘the value of the total product 
can […] buy more living labour than is contained in it’ (Marx, 1861-63, II, 153).  
 
3. The transformation of labour values into production prices  
Marx knows that relative prices are different from relative labour values, but he thinks 
there is no problem in the aggregate. He believes that ‘abstract labour’ is the 
substance of value (Screpanti, 2018), whilst production prices only express the 
surface appearance of market exchanges in reproduction equilibrium, and the 
appearance should not alter the substance. 
He seems to believe in a sort of a law of value conservation, and is confident that 
exchanges at production prices only redistribute value and surplus value among the 
different industries without altering their overall amount, so that the aggregate 
‘surplus value’, ‘value of labour power’ and ‘dead labour’ are not modified by 
exchanges at production prices.  If this were so, he could use the general rates of 
profit and exploitation in labour values even when dealing with the price system.  
Let 𝑒𝑣 and 𝑒𝑝 represent the rate of exploitation in labour values and production prices 
respectively; 𝑟𝑣 and 𝑟𝑝 the rate of profit in labour values and production prices 
respectively; ?̂? the price vector with a new normalization; 𝑤𝑣 and 𝑤𝑝 the unit ‘value of 
labour power’ and the wage. And let us consider the following:  
a) Fundamental invariance postulates 
1. 𝑒𝑣 = 𝑒𝑝  
2. 𝑟𝑣 = 𝑟𝑝  
b) Secondary invariance postulates4  
1. 𝑣(𝐼 − 𝐴)q = ?̂?(𝐼 − 𝐴)q 
2. 𝑤𝑣𝐿 = 𝑤𝑝𝐿 
                                           
4 Other invariance postulates can be deduced from these three. The invariance of gross output results 
from (b.1) and (b.3). The invariance of surplus value, from (b.1) and (b.2). 
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3. 𝑣𝐴q = ?̂?𝐴q 
The transformation problem boils down to finding a diagonal matrix 𝐷  such as 
𝑣𝐷=?̂?. In general, prices are determined up to a proportionality factor. Therefore 
there are many 𝐷, one for each possible numeraire, and the standard can be chosen in 
order to obtain one of the secondary invariance postulates. 
Embodied labour is a natural standard in the labour value system, which is made up 
of n scalar equations with n unknowns. Once labour values have been determined, it 
is sufficient to fix a basket of wage goods, 𝑏 , to determine the ‘value of labour 
power’, 𝑉 = 𝑤𝑣𝐿 = 𝑣𝑏𝐿, and the surplus value, 𝑆 = 𝐿 − 𝑣𝑏𝐿. There are no degrees of 
freedom, because labour values are determined without knowing the distributive 
variables. The case of the price system, in which prices depend on labour costs and 
the rate of profit, is different. Since social and political forces exogenously determine 
either 𝑤𝑝 or 𝑟𝑝, the system is made up of n scalar equations with n+1 unknowns. 
There is one degree of freedom, and the possibility of introducing a normalization 
equation to validate one secondary invariance postulate – but only one.5  
Validation of a secondary invariance postulate does not imply validation of the 
fundamental ones. The rates of exploitation in the two systems are:  
 
𝑒𝑣 =
𝑣(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝑤𝑣𝐿
𝑤𝑣𝐿
                                                                                                     (6)  
𝑒𝑝 =
?̂?(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝑤𝑝𝐿
𝑤𝑝𝐿
                                                                                                    (7)  
The rates of profits are:  
𝑟𝑣 =
𝑣(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝑤𝑣𝐿
𝑣𝐴𝑞
                                                                                                     (8)  
𝑟𝑝 =
?̂?(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝑤𝑝𝐿
?̂?𝐴𝑞
                                                                                                          (9)  
It is easy to see that 𝑒𝑣=𝑒𝑝 and 𝑟𝑣=𝑟𝑝 if and only if (b.1), (b.2) and (b.3) hold, which 
is not the case.6   
                                           
5 However, it is possible to force a further invariance postulate. If we assume that both distributive 
variables are unknown, i.e. that neither of them is determined exogenously, we end up with n+2 
variables. Thence we can posit two secondary invariance postulates and obtain, as a result, a 
fundamental one, but not both. For instance, by positing (b.1) and (b.2), (a.1) holds too. Loranger 
(2004) posits (a.2), which implies the invariance of aggregate capital and surplus value. 
Unsurprisingly, these devices have not met with much success among Marxist economists, as they 
boil down to an imaginative theory of exploitation according to which the profit rate and the wage 
are determined not by the social and political forces of class struggle, but by the theoretical 
requirements of an ingenious thinker. 
6 To see what kind of problems could arise from this result, suppose 𝑒𝑣<𝑒𝑝 and renormalize prices 
(now 𝑝 ) in such a way as to yield 𝑤𝑣𝐿 = 𝑤𝑝𝐿. Then the wage in the price system coincides with the 
quantity of labour embodied in the workers’ consumption. Now, since the rate of exploitation does 
not change with a change of standard, it is 𝑣(𝐼−𝐴)q−𝑤𝑣𝐿<𝑝 (𝐼−𝐴)q−𝑤𝑣𝐿. This means that, 
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Summing up, if value is a social relation, as claimed by Marx, then production prices 
are meaningful measures of value, for they convey information about both the 
technical and the distribution conditions of production, and change when exploitation 
changes. Labour values, instead, respond only to changes in technical conditions. This 
is the reason why the rate of exploitation and the profit rate are not invariant in the 
transformation procedure. Now, the actual rate of profit, 𝑟𝑝, is associated with the 
actual rate of exploitation, 𝑒𝑝, not with 𝑒𝑣. Thus the latter is an improper measure of 
exploitation.  
One might observe that the labour and capital coefficients of production convey 
information about the way society allocates ‘necessary labour’ among the various 
industries, given a certain output composition, and therefore the labour values they 
determine do, in fact, represent social relations. This proposition is correct if only one 
technique is available, yet it does not endorse the superiority of labour values, for all 
such ‘social’ information conveyed by them is also conveyed by production prices. In 
any case, it remains a ‘technicist reading of the theory of value’ (Elson, 1980, 126) or 
the expression of a purely ‘technological paradigm’ (De Vroey, 1982) because it 
makes labour values dependent on the sole technical conditions of production.  
Moreover, if more than one technique exists, then the labour value system may not 
convey correct information on the technical conditions of production. This is a big 
problem because Marx attributes a great importance to technical change in the process 
of capital accumulation and in class struggle. Okisho (1961) proves that, since the 
choice of techniques is motivated by profit, the evolution of technical change in a 
capitalist economy cannot be understood by using labour values. If there are two 
techniques, for instance, the price system correctly reveals which one is chosen by the 
capitalists, whilst use of the labour value system could lead to the wrong technique 
being chosen. The case of many techniques brings to light another reason why labour 
values do not convey correct information about the social relations of production: they 
do not regulate the actual production conditions when technical change is motivated 
by profit.  
 
4. A single system approach 
A way out of the labour value impasse is to give up equation (1) and stick with 
equation (2) as the sole correct representation of values. The double system approach 
to value determination gives way to a single system approach: ‘There is only one 
economy, one system, not two. There is no “underlying”, hidden economy, which 
operates in [labour] values’ (Duménil & Foley, 2006, 9). In other words, the only 
solution to the transformation problem is its dissolution.  
                                                                                                                                            
notwithstanding the value of labour power is identical in the labour value and price systems, the 
surplus value produced in the latter is greater than that produced in the former. It is as if the surface 
appearance of market exchanges had produced a surplus value over and above that produced in the 
labour value system. 
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Yet value can still be expressed in labour units, provided prices are normalized with 
labour productivity. This is the essence of the ‘new interpretation’ put forward by 
Duménil (1980; 1983-4), Foley (1982), Wolff, Roberts and Callari (1982) and Lipietz 
(1982). Following these contributions, other authors proposed reinterpretations which 
are rather different from each other but have in common the device of adopting labour 
productivity as a numeraire.   
So, let 𝑦 represent the productivity of labour and take it as a numeraire: 
𝑦 =
?̂?(𝐼–𝐴)𝑞
𝐿
= 1.            (10) 
When the net output is equal to the employed labour force, ?̂?(𝐼 − 𝐴)𝑞 = 𝐿 = 𝑣(𝐼 −
𝐴)𝑞,7 the wage share becomes a share of living labour. Then the rate of exploitation 
can be written as 
𝑒𝑝 =
?̂?(𝐼−𝐴)𝑞−𝑤𝑝𝐿
𝑤𝑝𝐿
=
𝐿−𝑤𝑝𝐿
𝑤𝑝𝐿
=
1−𝑤𝑝
𝑤𝑝
                  (11) 
Now we can confidently say that the rate of surplus value is a ratio between unpaid 
labour, 𝐿−𝑤𝑝𝐿, and paid labour, 𝑤𝑝𝐿. If 1 is a working day, 𝑤𝑝 is the part of it which 
is used to produce the wage, so 𝑒𝑝 is a ratio between the number of hours a worker 
works for the capitalist and the number she works for herself.8 Finally, recall equation 
(5). Then notice that, since the rate of exploitation is a pure number, it must be 𝑒𝑐 =
𝑒𝑝, or L*⁄𝐿=(1 − 𝑤𝑝)/𝑤𝑝. The ratio between the labour commanded by surplus value 
and that commanded by the wage is equal to the ratio between unpaid and paid labour. 
It seems that a re-reading or rather a re-writing of Marx is required.  The ‘new 
interpretation’ works as a ‘monetary’ theory of labour value.  is called ‘the monetary 
expression of value’ or ‘the monetary expression of labour time’, and 1/𝑦 is meant as 
the ‘labour expression of money’ or the ‘value of money’. In this approach ‘labour 
value’ is immediately represented by money, as one unit of labour is equivalent to one 
unit of money. 
To be true, a single system approach can be developed without any reference to 
equation (2), and a labour productivity numeraire can be applied to any conceivable 
price system (Mohun, 1994, 407; Duménil & Foley, 2006, 1). Equation (2) is the one 
that determines prices at the highest level of abstraction compatible with that of 
Marx’s analysis of value (Screpanti, 1993). At a different level of abstraction, the 
                                           
7 A labour productivity standard can already be found in Sraffa (1960, 10-1), who also develops a 
single system approach to value determination. He posits 𝐿=1 to normalize the level of activity. 
Then, to normalize prices, he makes the value of net output equal to unity, ?̂?(𝐼– 𝐴)𝑞 = 1. The two 
normalizations imply ?̂?(𝐼– 𝐴)𝑞 = 𝐿 = 1, and thence the (10). 
8 However, these definitions of unpaid and paid labour do not coincide with Marx’s definitions of 
surplus labour, 𝐿−𝑣𝑏𝐿, and the value of labour power, 𝑣𝑏𝐿. Also notice that, once normalized with 
𝑦, the prices of capital goods could be called ‘labour time-equivalents of constant capital’ (Foley, 
2000, 25). In any case, they correspond to Sraffa’s ‘dated quantities of labour’, ?̂?𝐴 = 𝑙[𝐴 +
(1 + 𝑟)𝐴2 +⋯(1 + 𝑟)𝑡𝐴𝑡+1] rather than to Marx’s ‘dead labours’, 𝑣𝐴 = 𝑙(𝐴 + 𝐴2 +⋯𝐴𝑡+1). 
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labour productivity standard could be applied to a fix-price oligopolistic economy 
with differential profit rates, as better argued in section 6 below. 
Finally, note that some new interpreters (e.g. Duménil, 1984; Duménil & Levy, 
1991; Moseley, 1999) define the wage without specifying the workers’ consumption 
basket and consider it as a variable, not as a given. Marx himself does so in his less 
abstract investigations into wage dynamics. And Sraffa (1960, 33), when treating ‘the 
whole of the wage as a variable’, clarifies that the practice of determining it as 
‘consisting of specified necessaries determined by physiological or social conditions 
[…] loses much of its force’. 
 
5. Are labour values vindicated by empirical research? 
In the years in which the ‘new interpretation’ was gaining popularity, several 
students9 carried out research on input-output tables that led to a surprising result – a 
sort of empirical law of value. Sectorial market prices seem to be highly correlated to 
labour values and production prices, with low coefficients of variation and regression 
lines exhibiting intercept coefficients near to 0, slope coefficients near to 1 and R-
squared over 0.9. Interestingly, the fitness of production prices is broadly as good as 
that of labour values, and sometimes even better. 
Now, there are two cases in which labour values are proportional to production 
prices: when the rate of profit is zero, or when the vector of labour coefficients, 𝑙∗, is 
an eigenvector of matrix 𝐴, i.e. the organic composition of capital is uniform. Thus, 
the differences between production prices and labour values shrink with the 
magnitude of 𝑟 or with the differences between 𝑙 and 𝑙∗.10 
So, if we assume 𝑟 ≅ 0 or 𝑙 ≅ 𝑙∗, we can expect a high correlation between labour 
values and production prices.11  Then, to account for the correlations with market 
prices, we could resort to the classical theory of competition, which conjectures that 
they undergo small and stable oscillations around production prices. 
Is this justification satisfactory? Perhaps not: first, because the assumptions 𝑟 ≅ 0 
and 𝑙 ≅ 𝑙∗ are not very realistic; second, because the classical theory of competition is 
                                           
9  For instance, Ochoa (1984), Shaikh (1988), Shaikh & Tonak (1994), Cockshott, Cottrell & 
Michaelson (1995), Cockshott & Cottrell (1997;1998), Tsoulfidis & Maniatis (2002), Zachariah 
(2006), Fröhlich (2012). 
10 The first derivatives of 𝑝 − 𝛾𝑣  with respect to 𝑟  are 𝑝′(𝑟) − 𝛾𝑣′(𝑟) > 0 , where 𝛾  is a 
proportionality factor. In fact 𝑝′(𝑟) = 𝑙(𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐴)−1𝐴(𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐴)−1 > 0  and 𝛾𝑣′(𝑟) = 0 . 
This proves the first proposition. As to the second, consider that, when the organic composition of 
capital is uniform, 𝑙∗𝐴 = 𝜇𝑙∗ and 𝑝∗ = 𝛾𝑣, where 𝜇 is an eigenvalue of 𝐴 (Kurz & Salvadori, 1995, 
112). Now let us compare two techniques, one with different organic compositions of capital, (𝑙, 𝐴), 
and one with a uniform organic composition of capital, (𝑙∗, 𝐴). The price vectors are 𝑝 and 𝑝∗. Then 
𝑝 − 𝛾𝑣 = 𝑝 − 𝑝∗ = 𝑙(𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐴)−1 − 𝑙∗(𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐴)−1 = (𝑙 − 𝑙∗)(𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐴)−1. 
11 Another possibility is to assume that the matrix of technical coefficients is a stochastic matrix 
tending to approach a structure with a uniform organic composition of capital. Schefold (2014) 
considers this ‘an important special case’, and proves that the same assumptions which validate the 
labour theory of value also validate the neoclassical surrogate production function. 
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difficult to accept as a correct representation of the market process in a modern 
capitalist economy. 
It seems that the above-mentioned empirical findings are incompatible with the 
theory developed by Marx, who does not assume low profit rates and a uniform 
organic composition of capital. On the other hand, he is very clear about the existence 
of a divergence between relative prices and labour values. Thus, what is really at stake 
is not Marx’s, but Ricardo’s labour theory of value (Dìaz & Osuna, 2005-6, 345), 
which does not accurately distinguish between labour values and production prices 
and does not claim to be 100% valid. Even so, the empirical law of value still lacks a 
theoretical justification, and the suspicion may arise that it is a statistical artefact. 
A considerable body of methodological literature has now cast ‘doubts on the logic 
of the so-called empirical labour theory of value’ (Mariolis & Soklis, 2010, 87). For 
instance, Ochoa (1984), Kliman (2002; 2004) and Nitzan & Bichler (2009, 95) 
observe that, since input-output prices result from aggregation into industries, 
problems with spurious correlations could be caused by differences among industry 
sizes. Petrovic (1987) and Steedman & Tomkins (1998) argue that the strength of 
correlations could vary depending on the choice of numeraire. Dìaz & Osuna (2005-6; 
2007; 2009) identify a major indeterminacy problem, caused by the unavoidable 
arbitrariness of the chosen measurement units. Interestingly, when the deviations 
between prices and ‘labour values’ are measured with a ‘numeraire-free’ standard 
(such as that proposed by Steedman & Tomkins, 1998, 383-84), they turn out to be 
not as small as the empirical law of value predicts.  Moreover, this law is falsified 
when panel data are used instead of cross sectional estimates (Vaona, 2014). 
Now, in a complex modern economy there are myriads of commodities with 
different prices. Input-output tables reduce this complexity to a few tens of 
‘commodities’ and industries. The output of an industry is estimated as an aggregate 
of many ‘similar’ commodities evaluated at their prices. On the other hand, ‘the 
commodity’ of an industry is defined as whichever represents the greatest part of 
sectorial production, all the others being ignored. Moreover, the production 
coefficients of input-output tables are fictitious technical coefficients. Each of them is 
calculated not as a ratio between the physical quantity of an input and a level of 
activity, but as a ratio between an aggregate of many similar inputs and an aggregate 
of industry outputs, with the disaggregated items being evaluated in terms of prices. 
All this means that two deeper problems lurk behind the difficulties of dimensional 
analysis. 
A first problem is that labour values, which should be calculated on the grounds of 
physical coefficients of production, are in fact reckoned in terms of ‘technical’ 
coefficients infected by prices. These ‘labour values’ are permeated by prices. Not by 
chance some students call them ‘direct prices’ or ‘value prices’ instead of ‘labour 
values’. An important statistical implication is that direct prices and market prices are 
not independent variates. Rather they are the results of two different elaborations of 
one variate, so the regressions between prices and ‘labour values’ might actually 
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‘correlate prices with… prices’ (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, 96). No surprise, then, if 
𝑅2 > 0.9. 
A second problem is as follows. Since the prices recorded in input-output tables and 
the direct prices calculated on their grounds refer to sectorial aggregate, their 
correlation in fact consists of a relation between averages of the actual prices and the 
direct prices of the myriads of real commodities. One can surmise how much 
dispersion is disposed of in this way. As Steedman & Tomkins (1998, 382) observe, 
the deviations between prices and ‘labour values’ tend to be smaller the lower the 
number of industries in an input-output table.12 How great would they be if the tables 
had thousands of rows and columns? Consider the following proposition: ‘across 
input-output years we have found that on average labour values deviate from market 
prices by only 9.2 per cent’ (Shaikh, 1988, 243) – just a 91% labour theory of value! 
All the same, how would it sound if it was made clear that each of these ‘labour 
values’ and ‘market prices’ are in fact averages of many labour values and prices 
whose dispersion is altogether ignored? 
These problems are insurmountable, given the limitations of national accounts data. 
Therefore it is understandable that some students tend to cope at least with the second 
one by assuming ‘that the distribution of such variables within each sector is similar 
in shape to the distribution across the sectors’ (Cockshott & Cottrell, 1995, 6-7). An 
input-output table is considered as a perfectly representative sample of the real 
economy.  
Summing up, the empirical law of value is defensible under some peculiar 
conditions. The fictitious production coefficients of input-output tables must be good 
proxies of the physical (industry average) technical coefficients; ‘labour values’ and 
market prices must be wholly independent variates; the Cockshott-Cottrell perfect 
sample hypothesis must be valid; the price-value deviations must remain low when 
measured with the Steedman-Tomkins ‘numeraire-free’ standard; and, of course, 
Ricardo’s labour theory of value must have a sound scientific explanation. 
 
6. What is the proper level of abstraction? 
Whatever its econometric achievements, this stream of research has an important 
theoretical implication for Marxist economics, as it raises the question of the historical 
appropriateness of the level of abstraction in value theory. Marx adopts the classical 
theory of competition with all its implicit assumptions, such as flexible market prices, 
price-taking behaviour, no oligopoly or monopoly power, no entry and exit barriers, 
no product differentiation. By virtue of this theory the actual rates of profit are 
                                           
12  To be precise, the deviations should shrink with the dimension of an input-output matrix 
compared to the dimension of an economy, defined in terms of the number of real commodities 
produced in it. This calls to mind Cockshott’s (2010, 5) observation that ‘the larger the population of 
the country, the closer is the fit between observed prices and labour values’. It sounds like an 
involuntary admission of weakness, presuming that the number of a country’s inhabitants is 
correlated to the variety of commodities they produce. 
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expected to gravitate around a uniform rate. However, it is highly doubtful that those 
assumptions correctly describe an industrial economy. 
They were not even justified in Smith’s times (remember his invectives against the 
cabals or monopolies who fix prices to squeeze the buyers). In The Wealth of Nations 
they only portray an ideal state of ‘perfect liberty’. Did they correctly describe the 
market process in the mid-nineteenth century? After all, Marx himself observes the 
tendency of company size and market power to grow in the advanced capitalist 
countries of his times. Thus, by complying with that theory of competition, he accepts 
a cliché of the science of his times, but at the price of an improper level of abstraction. 
Farjoun & Machover (1985) suggest a way out of this difficulty. They consider 
competitive production prices as unrealistic ‘ideal prices’. In the real world, profit 
rates have no tendency to converge to uniformity, and market prices no tendency to 
converge to competitive prices of production.  
This fact can be explained by the theory of normal pricing. Markets are regulated by 
oligopolistic competition; prices are rather sticky and are fixed by applying a gross 
mark-up to variable costs (labour costs plus circulating capital), which are calculated 
by firms with a view to normal capacity utilization in the long run. The mark-up 
magnitudes differ across firms and industries, and reflect the diverse ‘degrees of 
monopoly’. 
Let us now distinguish between competitive production prices and oligopolistic 
production prices, the former yielding a uniform rate of profit. Normal prices are 
oligopolistic production prices, since they are determined by production conditions. 
Still, they are also market prices, i.e. the prices at which commodities are actually 
sold. From an analytical viewpoint, they are determined by rewriting equation (2) 
as 𝑝 =(𝑙+𝑝𝐴)𝑈, where 𝑈 = {𝑢𝑖} is a diagonal matrix of different mark-ups.
13 Notice 
that restricting input costs to circulating capital as a basis for price determination is 
not a simplifying hypothesis in this case, but the illustration of a usual practice of 
firms. Moreover, there is no need to assume constant returns to scale throughout. It is 
sufficient to observe that variable costs are constant in a neighbourhood of normal 
capacity utilization. 
The fundamental proposition argued in this article is still valid: oligopolistic 
production prices yield a correct theory of value, as they express both the technical 
and social conditions of production, now including the oligopoly power by which a 
firm may exploit consumers and the workers of other firms. 
The decision to treat the profit rate as a random variable is theoretically grounded on 
‘a systematic and principled rejection of the concept of a uniform profit rate’ 
(Farjoun, 1984, 12). Plausibly, this also implies a principled rejection of the concept 
of ‘direct prices’ yielding a zero profit rate. All Marxists should learn such a lesson. 
The assumption of differential profit rates within a fix-price model is more realistic 
and more general than the assumption of uniformity. More general, because the 
                                           
13 Now wages are treated as paid in advance because this is the way firms fix prices, even if they 
pay wages post factum (Lonzi, Riccarelli & Screpanti, 2017). 
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classical and neoclassical theory of competitive markets can be considered as a 
special case – the limit case in which all the degrees of monopoly are nil. This is often 
assumed in order to simplify theoretical problems and prop up ideological tenets; and 
therefore it can be legitimately assumed with critical intentions. But it is not very 
useful to explain the real structure and dynamics of a modern capitalist economy. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Several Marxists have contested the ‘new interpretation’ from a methodological and a 
philological point of view. To mention just a few: Roemer (1990) observes that 
abandoning the dual system approach opens value determination to arbitrariness; 
Shaik & Tonak (1994), that it turns the whole relationship between surplus value and 
profit on its head; Mongiovi (2002), that it redefines value in a trivial way; Fine, 
Lapavitsas & Saad-Filho (2004), that it wrongly assumes value to be immediately 
represented by money. More generally, it is hard to believe that Marx reasons in terms 
of a single system approach. But who can claim to have established ‘what Marx really 
said’, in this era of hermeneutics? In any case, although philological concerns are 
understandable, it should be acknowledged that the ‘new interpretation’ has helped 
convince many Marxists that the labour theory of value can be abandoned without 
prejudicing the theory of exploitation. 
Marx seems possessed by a twofold self. He is an essentialist philosopher who 
believes value has a ‘natural’ substance, and a scientist who knows that value 
represents social relations (Screpanti, 2018). The labour theory of value is an artefact 
of the essentialist philosopher and a legacy he receives from Ricardo. It is a source of 
various analytical riddles and must be skirted by all Marxists who side with the social 
scientist. 
Finally, as brought to light by some ‘empirical Marxists’, the level of abstraction 
adopted by Marx in developing his theory of value is influenced by a cliché of the 
economic science of his times, namely, the assumption of perfectly competitive 
markets. Since Marx himself observes the growth of firms’ size in the advanced 
capitalist countries of his times, a more appropriate level of abstraction should be 
based on a fix-price model of oligopolistic competition predicting a stable 
structure of different profit rates. 
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